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The past few years have seen a resurgence of interest in the scientific study of magic. Despite being
only a few years old, this “new wave” has already resulted in a host of interesting studies, often
using methods that are both powerful and original. These developments have largely borne out our
earlier hopes (Kuhn et al., 2008) that new opportunities were available for scientific studies based
on the use of magic. And it would seem that much more can still be done along these lines.
But in addition to this, we also suggested that it might be time to consider developing an outright
science of magic—a distinct area of study concerned with the experience of wonder that results
from encountering an apparently impossible event1. To this end, we proposed a framework as to
how this might be achieved (Rensink and Kuhn, 2015). A science can be viewed as a systematic
method of investigation involving three sets of issues: (i) the entities considered relevant, (ii) the
kinds of questions that can be asked about them, and (iii) the kinds of answers that are legitimate
(Kuhn, 1970). In the case of magic, we suggested that this could be done at three different levels,
each focusing on a distinct set of issues concerned with the nature of magic itself: (i) the nature
of magical experience, (ii) how individual magic tricks create this experience, and (iii) organizing
knowledge of the set of known tricks in a more comprehensive way (Rensink and Kuhn, 2015). Our
framework also included a base level focused on how the methods of magic could be used as tools
to investigate issues in existing fields of study.
Lamont (2010) and Lamont et al. (2010) raised a number of concerns about the possibility of
such a science, which we have addressed (Rensink and Kuhn, 2015). More recently, Lamont (2015)
raised a new objection, arguing that although base-level work (i.e., applications of magic methods)
might be useful, there is too little structure in magic tricks for them to be studied in a systematic
way at the other levels, ruling out a science of magic. We argue here, however, that although this
concern raises some interesting challenges for this science, it does not negate the possibility that it
could exist, and could contribute to the study of the mind.
Many different kinds of magic tricks clearly exist, and Lamont (2015) provides some nice
examples of these. But a science of magic centers primarily around experiential effects, not tricks
(Rensink and Kuhn, 2015). The first level of our framework above the base, for instance, focuses on
aspects of experience that are largely unique tomagic. One such set of issues concerns the possibility
of different types—and levels—of wonder; an example is the work of Griffiths (2015) on the degree
of interest evoked by various magical transformations. Issues also arise around people’s impression
of a magical “stuff” which acts as a causal agent, and the extent to which our perceptions and beliefs
can deviate from objective reality. In all of this, the details of how the experiences are evoked are
irrelevant. Said another way: at this level, the scientific study of magic is not concerned with the
nature of magic tricks themselves, but with themagical aspects of experience created by these tricks.
And these aspects appear quite amenable to study.
Magic tricks are of course important, and are the focus of the next level. Here, the emphasis is
on how the effects evoked in each trick (including the sense of wonder) are created. A complete trick
1As discussed in Rensink and Kuhn (2015), such an area could be implemented in a variety of ways, and have various possible
labels—e.g., a “science of wonder” or a “psychology of magic.” Since those issues are irrelevant to the discussion here, we will
simply use “science of magic” as a general term for all of these.
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is a complex entity, with a method that typically has multiple
components. For example, a magician may use patter to set up
high-level expectations, and then misdirect perception to ensure
that the observer does not notice the “main” manipulations.
Explorations have already begun of several such components—
e.g., the manipulations underlying the French Drop (Phillips
et al., 2015), the timing used in simple coin vanishes (Beth and
Ekroll, 2014), the social cues in the Vanishing Ball Illusion (Kuhn
and Land, 2006), and the timing needed for a Riﬄe Force (Olson
et al., 2015). Ideally, such studies will become more powerful,
knitting together our knowledge of individual components, and
allowing us to understand each magic trick in its entirety.
Lamont (2015) considers magic tricks as lacking sufficient
structure for this to happen. There appear to be two reasons for
this concern. The first is sheer variety—the fact that the number
of items under consideration appears “endless.” However, such
variety does not of itself prevent a scientific approach to a topic.
In the case of language, for instance, the number of possible
sentences has exactly this “endless” character. But they can still
be analyzed using approaches such as phrase-structure grammar2
(Chomsky, 1957) and psycho-linguistic experimentation (see
O’Brien et al., 2015). In such approaches, appropriate selection
of more basic elements (and their rules of combination) can
let us understand aspects of a potentially infinite set of items.
Methods in magic appear amenable to this, being composed of
distinct components. Lamont (2015) provides a nice discussion
of what some of these might be. Note that there is no problem if
a component is used for different purposes in different tricks—
if its analysis is based on functional considerations (as we have
suggested), there will be no ambiguity in its role.
Another source of variety mentioned is a lack of clear
boundaries. In this view, a trick carried out in a slightly different
way is a different entity; given the nearly infinite number of small
differences possible in methods (e.g., exact timing) and effects
(e.g., exactly where a card appears), this results in a potentially
infinite number of tricks. But this challenge has been faced—
and met—in many other sciences. For example, each individual
animal is different (and even changes over time). But this does
not impede biology—this matter can be handled by the careful
use of abstraction, with animals collected into groups of largely
similar character. This approach could be readily applied to
magic tricks, considering as equivalent those with little or no
differences in how they are experienced—e.g., tricks in which the
forcing techniques have slightly different timings, but which are
equally effective.
A more interesting factor—one obliquely referred to in
Lamont (2015)—is what might be called contingency: different
methods can often achieve the same effect, and no reasons may
exist as to why one method should be chosen over another.
However, this might be handled by grouping together those tricks
with similar effects, and focusing on the aspects common to the
group. Another approach would be to define a particular trick as
using a particular method; the issue would then reduce to one
2There is disagreement about the extent that phrase-structure grammars actually
describe various languages (e.g., Postal, 1964). But this is primarily based on
empirical considerations, not a priori ones about variety.
of explaining its use in a given performance. The choice made
could depend on a large number of factors, such as the tricks used
in the rest of the performance, or how the magician is feeling
at that moment. Such contingency reflects the artistic nature of
a magic performance, but does not rule out the possibility of
scientific study. Given that humans respond in roughly similar
ways to a given stimulus, there are stable regularities in what
results once a particular method and context have been selected.
(If this did not occur, magic could never have become a popular
form of entertainment.) And such regularities can be studied in a
systematic way3.
Regarding possibilities at the highest level of our framework
(systematization), Lamont (2015) claims that the lack of structure
in tricks also prevents their classification in a principled way.
Note, however, that systematic analysis is just one level of our
framework: even if this were somehow entirely impossible, the
other levels would remain. And contrary to Lamont’s assertion,
we have never claimed that a science of magic requires a complete
inventory or classification. Although, a complete inventory or
classification is a laudable goal, it is not a necessary one: such
systems can often be valuable even when incomplete—e.g.,
predicting new entities and new relationships.
But even assuming that magic tricks have little structure,
would this necessarily prevent their systematic classification?
Various taxonomies formagic tricks clearly exist (see e.g., Lamont
andWiseman, 1999); as such, the issue is not whether a taxonomy
is possible, but how principled its organization can be. Many such
systems rely on “natural kinds”—well-defined categorical entities
such as chemical elements or groups of related animals (e.g.,
species and genera). But although natural kinds can facilitate
classification, they are not necessary for this. It is entirely possible,
for example, to relate in a systematic way designs described
by continuous parameters, even when these parameters interact
with each other in complex ways (see Woodbury, 2010).
As to how a principled classification might be created for
magic tricks: this is a complex issue, involving a great amount
of empirical detail. This paper (and our two earlier ones) are in
some ways preliminary exercises in the philosophy of magic4,
concerned with issues of a more general nature. But as an
example of how such a venture might proceed, we have elsewhere
proposed a way to classify methods of misdirection (Kuhn et al.,
2014). This is based on two principles: (i) rely on psychological
mechanisms as much as possible, and (ii) have the highest levels
of the taxonomy center around the mechanisms affected, and
not the mechanisms that control these. (For details, see Kuhn
et al., 2014.) These principles greatly reduce the number of
arbitrary decisions that typically enter into a classification of
magic tricks (see Lamont, 2015); as such, we believe the result
to be a fairly natural one. Other classifications are of course
possible. For instance, some classifications may be better than
ours for particular purposes, such as the teaching of prospective
magicians. And even in established sciences such as biology,
proposed taxonomies can vary—e.g., have more distinctions
3This situation is far from unique. For example, the meaning of a word depends
on its context. But this has not prevented the scientific study of language.
4Or more precisely, the philosophy of science as applied to the study of magic.
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in taxonomic categories to capture more variability, or fewer
distinctions to create a simpler organization (see e.g., Corliss,
1976). Finding the “sweet spot” in all of this will take time.
But if history is any guide, it can be done. Our proposal—or
one like it—therefore appears to have some potential to help
researchers use magic to better understand perception, memory,
and reasoning. And it could equally well enable knowledge of
perception, memory, and reasoning to help better understand
magic.
Are there factors we have not considered, factors that might
influence the development of a science of magic? Undoubtedly.
Will any of these ultimately prevent its development? Only time
will tell. But there are grounds for optimism. For example,
important advances have recently been made toward a science
of film and a science of music, involving new issues that touch
upon much more than just basic aspects of perception and
cognition (e.g., Levitin, 2007; Ball, 2010; Shimamura, 2013;
Smith, 2014). Given the nature of their subject matter, these
areas are vulnerable to many of the same concerns as have
been raised about a science of magic; nevertheless, the scientific
development of these areas is proceeding. And if there are
worries that no such attempts have ever succeeded, consider
the case of steam engines. During the first century of their
existence, an enormous number of these were created, with
a great deal of variety and contingency in their design. And
eventually, work began on a scientific framework to investigate
the principles involved (see McClellan and Dorn, 2006). The
resulting science—thermodynamics—has become one of the
mainstays of modern physics, not only providing considerable
insight into what such engines can and cannot do, but also
helping us understand other processes of nature, from the
metabolism of cells to the energy production of stars. Even if
there is only a small chance that such a development could be
possible for magic, it would appear to be a chance well worth
taking.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We wish to thank the three reviewers for their feedback on a
previous version of this paper. This work was supported by the
Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada,
via a grant to RR.
REFERENCES
Ball, P. (2010). The Music Instinct: How Music Works and Why We Can’t Do
Without It. Oxford: University Press.
Beth, T., and Ekroll, V. (2014). The curious influence of timing on the magical
experience evoked by conjuring tricks involving false transfer: decay of amodal
object permanence? Psychol. Res. 79, 513–522. doi: 10.1007/s00426-014-
0584-2
Chomsky, N. (1957). Syntactic Structures. Paris: Mouton.
Corliss, J. O. (1976). On lumpers and splitters of higher taxa in ciliate systematics.
Trans. Am. Microsc. Soc. 95, 430–442. doi: 10.2307/3225136
Griffiths, T. L. (2015). Revealing ontological commitments by magic. Cognition
136, 43–48. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2014.10.019
Kuhn, G., Amlani, A. A., and Rensink, R. A. (2008). Towards a science of magic.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 12, 349–354. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2008.05.008
Kuhn, G., Caffaratti, H. A., Teszka, R., and Rensink, R. A. (2014). A
psychologically-based taxonomy of misdirection. Front. Psychol. 5:1392. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01392
Kuhn, G., and Land, M. F. (2006). There’s more to magic than meets the eye. Curr.
Biol. 16, R950–R951. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2006.10.012
Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd Edn. Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press.
Lamont, P. (2010). The misdirected quest. Psychology 23, 978–980. Available
online at: https://thepsychologist.bps.org.uk/volume-23/edition-12/misdir
ected-quest
Lamont, P. (2015). Problems with the mapping of magic tricks. Front. Psychol.
6:855. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00855
Lamont, P., Henderson, J. M., and Smith, T. J. (2010). Where science and magic
meet: the illusion of a “science of magic.” Rev. Gen. Psychol. 14, 16–21. doi:
10.1037/a0017157
Lamont, P., and Wiseman, R. (1999).Magic in Theory. Hartfield: Hermetic Press.
Levitin, D. J. (2007). This is Your Brain on Music: The Science of a Human
Obsession. New York, NY: Plume.
McClellan, J. E., and Dorn, H. (2006). Science and Technology in World History,
2nd Edn. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
O’Brien, E. J., Cook, A. E., and Lorch, R. F. Jr. (2015). Inferences During Reading.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Olson, J. A., Amlani, A. A., Raz, A., and Rensink, R. A. (2015). Influencing
choice without awareness. Consc. Cogn. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2015.01.004.
[Epub ahead of print].
Phillips, F., Natter, M. B., and Egan, E. J. L. (2015). Magically deceptive
biological motion—the French Drop Sleight. Front. Psychol. 6:371. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00371
Postal, P. (1964). “Limitations of phrase structure grammars,” in The Structure of
Language: Readings in the Philosophy, eds J. A. Fodor and J. J. Katz (Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall), 137–151.
Rensink, R. A., and Kuhn, G. (2015). A framework for using magic to study the
mind. Front. Psychol. 5:1508. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01508
Shimamura, A. P. (ed.). (2013). Psychocinematics: Exploring Cognition at the
Movies. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Smith, T. J. (2014). “Audiovisual correspondences in Sergei Eisenstein’s Alexander
Nevsky: a case study in viewer attention,” in Cognitive Media Theory (AFI
Film Reader), eds P. Taberham and T. Nannicelli. (New York, NY: Routledge),
85–105.
Woodbury, R. (2010). Elements of Parametric Design. New York, NY: Routledge.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2015 Rensink and Kuhn. This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use,
distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original
author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal
is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or
reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 October 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1576
